Theoretical Understanding of Energy Transition in Germany Part 3 - Future of Germany's energiewende

Last week, I discussed four institutional arrangements theories that can explain how community initiative emerges and develops. In Germany, it is a combination of community- and state-oriented system where the former plays a fundamental role in initiating community RE projects whilst the latter is a key to expanding the scale of the RE project into national level. Today, the country produces about a quarter of its energy through RE (Oteman et al, 2014). This has contributed to both increased energy security and global climate change mitigation significantly. However, there are a number of constraints in further developing RE in Germany because of the issue of storage capacity (Energy Transition, 2015). In this post, I shall examine how the country will address the problem to further develop its Energiewende.

To begin with, let me define the key term. Storage capacity refers to the capacity of energy being stored for a certain length of time until utilized (Gawel et al 2015). In Germany, storage systems only meets 1h of demand today (Gullberg et al, 2014). The implication of this to Germany's RE is that Since wind and solar power, which dominates Germany's installed capacity of RE, only produce electricity when wind blows or the sunlight is available, there is a significant gap in the amount of production during the day. When both are unavailable, electricity shortfalls can occur, causing massive destruction not only to domestic individual life but also to industrial activities. Germany used to consider nuclear power as a means of combating the shortages before the Fukushima disaster, yet, they decided to complete demolition of nuclear power plants by 2020, reflecting a strong public opinion against the supposedly dangerous, risky energy source  (Gullberg et al, 2014).

Photo.1 Pumped-storage facility in Germany (Reference: Energy Transition, 2015)

Technically, storage capacity can be increased using batteries, hydrogen, methane, compressed air and pumped-storage hydropower. However, these are generally inefficient and very expensive therefore not cost-effective (Gullberg et al, 2014). I think it is true that investing in these costly technology regionally would do nothing but leave a significant debt. Nevertheless, Germany recently embarks on a novel strategy that could resolve their problem, namely, international cooperation in electricity exchange with Norway (Gullberg et al, 2014).

Norway is known for its extensive installation capacity of hydroelectricity due to its geomorphology (Gullberg et al, 2014). In fact, the country's electricity sector is already almost completely dependent upon hydropower therefore produces almost no GHG emissions (Statkraft, 2015). Obviously, the country does not need to further develop RE considering the fact that they are fully functioned by hydropower. However, since there is still a great potential for Norway to expand the system, other European countries perceive the nation as 'green battery', meaning they are able to store energy produced by RE in hydropower (Gullberg et al, 2014). Basically, Norway pumps water from a lower elevation to a reservoir at a higher elevation using electricity produced from RE In Germany. Then, this low-carbon electricity can be stored and released to produce electricity to sell back to Germany when electricity prices are high in shortfalls (mostly at night) (Deutsche Welle, 2015). I think this is a win-win solution both to Germany and Norway - the former for solving intermittency problems, and the latter for making money and compensating for its fossil-intensive sectors - transport and heating. This helps achieve Norway's commitment to increase its share of renewables in the 'energy' mix to 67.5% by 2020 (Note that it's not 'electricity').

Photo.2 Hydropower in Norway (Reference: Celsias, 2015)

Some critics say the cost of installing new facilities particularly international grid connection such as in the North Sea and the one connecting the North and the South is extremely high. This challenge can be further complicated when environmental activists join in to campaign for nature conservation in the area of high-volatile cables being installed. The most recent example of opposition is those emerging to the building of a pumped-storage hydro facility at Atdorf in Baden-Wuttemburg (Gullberg et al, 2014). Furthermore, some Norwegian disagree with the proposal because they fear that development of new grid systems will increase electricity prices and that the use of land and water for pumped-storage will potentially destruct natural environments. The former is very true because energy facility is public owned therefore any cost associated with the development / maintenance will be reflected upon electricity bills (Gullberg et al, 2014).

Nevertheless, I suppose that Germany needs to go ahead with the project simply because they have no other choices. All nuclear power plants are now due to be demolished by 2020, and the dirty fossil fuel, lignite, naturally rich in Germany, has attracted a massive public opposition concerning deforestation, pollution and climate change. Some may argue that installing further RE in Germany would help reduce the risk of electricity shortfalls. However, I believe that regional / international cooperation is more important than achieving national energy security by generating renewable energy by 100% because the latter is very vulnerable to regional climate. For example, if anomalous rainy weather continues across Germany even for a couple of days, it will certainly lead to electricity shortfalls in many parts of the region particularly where storage capacity is low. By contrast, if places are connected to each other energywise, regionally, nationally and internationally, this can reduce the possibility of sudden blackout because they can exchange energy whenever necessary.

What I think Germany needs to develop the above system, primarily with Norway, is the following. First, political commitment of both countries is essential in order to attract sufficient investment to develop new infrastructure such as the grid system. As discussed in the earlier posts, the state involvement plays a fundamental role in increasing the investor's confidence therefore ensuring financial backing. Secondly, public debate over the development of the technology is essential to reach an agreement that minimizes the socio-economic and environmental costs of the project. As Gawel et al (2015) perceive the Energiewende as 'a long-term process of transforming a complex sociotechnical system', energy transition needs to come with restructuring societal systems including the change of people's perspectives and behaviours. Thirdly, the distribution of the burden incurred by energy transition should be taken into consideration more seriously. Gawel et al (2015) argue that It sometimes may not be intransparent or in contradiction to the fundamental values of fairness. Indeed, some consider the additional cost incurred by installing RE under the FIT system as a implicit environmental taxation that does not differentiate between the rich and poor. Clearly, it depends on the scale of geography (regional, national and international), yet there need to be some serious discussions over equity at high political level.

To sum, Germany's energy transition in the next few decades need to put more focus on how they cooperate with other countries like Norway to derive a win-win energy strategy. In this way, each country both maximizes and benefits from their potential economically. Some economists may consider this as an example of semi-competitive market, which represents the situation where a fairly large number of companies compete with each other in the industry with slightly different products. In other words, countries produce energy using different technology which is the most appropriate there both technologically and economically and trade it in the international market. Despite electricity transmission causes energy loss over a long distance, I think electricity exchange is still a viable option within a certain geographical proximity. Any thoughts or questions will be much appreciated!

Theoretical Understanding of Energy Transition in Germany Part 2

Last week, I discussed brief theoretical analogy that explains how community energy can be developed. If you have not read it yet, you may find it useful to have a quick read though it from here. To recap some basic points, there are three different ways to describe the occurrence and opportunities for community initiatives; agency-oriented; structure approach; and biophysical conditions (Oteman et al, 2014). Among these, structure approach is considered the most appropriate because the governance of energy is managed through the combination of the following sets of institutional logics; market-oriented system; state-oriented system; community-oriented system; and corporatist association order (Oteman et al, 2014). Today, I will look into the structural aspects of Germany's energy transition considering the institutional arrangements theory.

Photo.1 Energy turbine in Germany (Reference: North East Windmills, 2013)

To begin with, let me clarify some key terminologies introduced above. Hall and Taylor (2006) define the theory as 'the formal / informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy'. In other words, it is a way of describing how politics is structured by non-political traits such as socio-cultural and economic aspects of the community. Oteman et al (2014) argue that the extent to which community initiatives become prosperous is highly dependent upon the degree of significance of each component. As I mentioned above, there are mainly four systems that can explain how initiatives are organized locally; market-oriented; state-oriented; community-oriented; and corporatist associational order. Now, let's explore each of these arrangements theory.

First of all, market-oriented system refers to a system in which the principle of dispersed competition and profit-making market players are the most influential actors (Oteman et al, 2014). It essentially favours larger market parties due to economies of scale therefore the entry of small-scale or non-profit players are almost impossible. Also, this provides little uniformity in rules and policies at local level since the government's intervention is limited. The consequence is lack of knowledge, resources and subsidies which are essential for community projects to be successful (Oteman et al, 2014). This further leads to lowering the availability of funding from private investors. Therefore, in this system, community initiatives are least likely to develop.

By contrast, in state-oriented order, a system is guided by hierarchical control with the government's intervention (Oteman et al, 2014). The advantages are the greater levels of funding, tenders and permission grants in comparison to the market-oriented system. However, it comes with some drawbacks such as little chance for new technology or experimental designs which do not fit into the institutional structure of rules and finance of the state (Oteman et al, 2014). In addition, there is sometimes friction in land use between the government and the locals because they do not always understand community values of land. For instance, if the government decides to cut and burn the part of local forests to construct solar PVs whilst local residents perceive natural beauty as one of the most valuable property of the community, the community incentives are likely to be lowered.

Next, community-oriented system is based on spontaneous solidarity of community actors (Oteman et al, 2014). Fundamentally, the incentives for community initiatives in this system are derived from their own experiences such as deforestation, pollution, security concern, and aspiration for socio-economic revitalization. In contrast to the state-oriented order, it leaves larger room for decentralized policy and local variation that is adjusted to specific circumstances, preferences or dominant ideas prevailing in the community. This enables to develop the local-specific knowledge and resources needed for the projects. Also, whether community initiatives develop capacity are counting upon the strength of the network among the community and other stakeholders. It provides good institutional space, namely, discrepancy freedom of community initiatives to decide autonomously about the design a project and its contents (Oteman et al, 2014). Nonetheless, some of the challenges they must face are limited funding from outside if the network is limited at the onset of projects, and voluntary attitudes of the locals are not always promising and therefore can deteriorate in long term.

Lastly, in corporatist associational order, a system is governed through an institutionalized and organized associational structure (Oteman et al, 2014). It is considered a new hybrid institution where societal roots of shared responsibility and environmental concerns are combined with market tasks such as profitability, security and access and governmental responsibilities (Oteman et al, 2014). This form of governance has already been seen in other sectors, for example, agricultural and housing associations (Oteman et al, 2014). In energy system, institutions are originally developed from community initiatives but are greatly institutionalized into a formal decision making body. It does not need to follow a full corporatist system, rather, it could also lead the system into the one in which state and civil society cooperate together to develop regulatory framework that brings about new modes of cooperation (Oteman et al, 2014).

These four institutional logics are not solely dominating one's energy sector, yet, countries show a various degree of combination of these systems. In Germany, (Oteman et al, 2014) aruge that the nation's energy transition shows the strongest trait of state-oriented system. As I described in the last two post, Germany's RE installation capacity started to increase rapidly once the FIT bill was passed through the Bundestag in 1990 and further accelerated in 2000 when Renewable Energy Act was introduced (Energy Transition, 2015). Until then, community initiatives were very limited because of the lack of knowledge, investor's confidence and funding.

Nonetheless, I think it is important to note that Germany's energy transition did not emerge out of the state. As explained in the earlier post, the key to the nation's oldest FIT legislation is the emergence of anti-nuclear sentiments in 70-80s (National Geographic, 2015). These local collective actions across the nation gradually led to the formation of Green Party, which contributed to introducing 'green' ideas to the Bundestag later on (National Geographic, 2015). This is also regarded as an example of the corporatist association order because the nationwide green movement resulted in the environmental associational structure, which then was formed into the Green Party that is now politically powerful in Germany today. Therefore, the emergence of Germany's energy transition was achieved in community-oriented system and was further developed through the state's intervention.

In the next post, I would like to discuss the future of Germany's energy transition. Any comments or questions are much appreciated!

Theoretical Understanding of Energy Transition in Germany Part 1

In the last post, I looked through the history of Germany's Energiewende (Energy Transition). Based upon the historical narratives, what I would like to do today is to make some literature reviews on community initiatives in renewable energy (RE) development.

First and foremost, let me clarify some basic terms. Community initiatives are defined as 'decentralized, non-governmental initiatives of local communities and citizens to promote the production of particular goods or services (in this case RE)' (Oteman et al, 2014). In Germany, such RE schemes were quickly introduced following the first FIT scheme in 1990 and further accelerated in 2000 when Renewable Energy Act was passed through the Bundestag (Energy Transition, 2015).

Photo.1. Wind turbines in Ockholm Schleswig-Holstein, near the planned start of the new high-voltage power line (The Gurdian, 2014)

In the study undertaken by Oteman et al, (2014), there are three major theoretical explanations about the emergence and opportunities for community initiatives; agency-oriented; structure approach; and biophysical conditions. They share some common understanding about RE development, however, their approach is slightly different from each other.

Firstly, agency-oriented approach focuses on different individual features such as detailed local knowledge, intrinsic motivation and leadership capabilities. It comprises of four sub-components; cultural capacity; organizational capacity; infrastructural capacity and personal capacity. Cultural capacity describes what is considered to be legitimate and socially accepted as sustainable objectives. These are inherently embedded in their community values, and examples include autarky, anti-capitalism, energy security and anti-nuclear sentiments (Oteman et al, 2014). Organizational capacity looks at the position of community RE initiatives within the wider local community. It determines how socio-politically powerful they can be to engage people or key stakeholders to make initiatives prosperous (Oteman et al, 2014). When it succeeds, it creates a sense of ownership and responsibility, reducing the effects of Not-In-My-Back-Yard. Infrastructural capacity looks at the provision of facilities by government or the market, such as grid access. Lastly, personal capacity focuses on resources of the individual memebers of an initiatives such as voluntary contributions, skills, knowledge and leadership qualities, values and enthusiasm (Oteman et al, 2014).

I think the theory is very useful when it comes to describing the characteristics of individual RE initiatives. For instance, Germany displays great cultural capacity of 'green' values, which has been exemplified in the demolition movement of nuclear power plants and fossil fuel-based energy system (National Geographic, 2015). However, it does not really explain 'WHY' different countries display distinct patterns of appearance of RE community initiatives and their degree of success.

Secondly, structural approach looks into community RE initiatives from three different attributes; socio-cultural; economic; and legal (Oteman et al, 2014). Socio-cultural subsystem describes the public perception of energy and the role of community in this and attitude towards experimenting and innovation. This is equivalent to the cultural capacity in the agency-oriented approach. Economic attribute, however, is a very different approach to the former. It essentially looks at the division & allocation of financial and other material resources among the actors or general economic climate (Oteman et al, 2014). This emphasizes the fact that whether an initiative is economically viable and successful is highly dependent on the expected profitability of the project.

Legal attribute refers to the formal legislation that directly favours RE, for example, Electricity Acts, grid access, degree of territorial functional decentralization, structure of the policy and procedures for collective decision-making. It is a critical part that both promote and restrain the development of RE. Arguably, Germany would not have been able to achieve the current levels of community RE without a series of law that favours their development (Nolden, 2013). I suppose it is because, in market economy, large utility companies can easily price out the small-scale community energy companies / associations through economies of scale. It is an example of oligopoly where a relatively small number of firms dominate the industry (Gutiérrez-Alcaraz and Sheblé, 2006). Therefore, there needs to be government's intervention in supply side if community-level energy companies want to enter the industry. What I think the structure approach is significant is that it can be used to compare and explain the patterns of RE development in different countries because of the quantitative economic and legal approaches.

Thirdly, biological conditions fundamentally look into the biological and physical availability of RE production (Oteman et al, 2014). This includes the annual sunlight hours and wind potential which determine the potential energy production. It also refers to the spatial planning of the project such as the degree of urbanization and remoteness of rural regions. These spatial layout is an important physical condition that influences local structure and agency characteristics of RE development. In Germany, for instance, the north is frequently characterized by high wind potential and therefore most wind turbines are found there. By contrast, the south has historically struggled with implementing RE despite some solar panels and community-level wind turbines being increasingly introduced. In fact, it is still heavily reliant upon nuclear power (The Guardian, 2014). Although some cities like Munich have adopted a strategic plan to produce wind energy in the North Sea and feed their electricity demand, known as Dantysk project, to me, the true 'local energy security' does not seem to be met. I guess they also need to develop locally-produced alternatives such as biogas, so that in case the energy transmission is to be shut down or politically targeted.

Among these three approaches, Oteman et al (2014) put a great emphasis on the structural characteristics of the energy sector to give the theoretical understanding of the occurrence and development of RE. They argue that governance of the energy sector is managed through the combination of the following four institutional logics; market-oriented system; state-oriented system; community-oriented system; and corporatist associational order (Oteman et al, 2014). These essentially form a set of interrelated incentives & constraints that influence agent's behaviour and strategies. Here, the extent to which the state, market and associations are complementary to community RE initiatives and offer them 'institutional space' is studied as 'institutional arrangements theory' (Oteman et al, 2014). Halls and Taylor (2006) defines it as 'the formal/informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity/political economy', which are reflected in the structure approach. In other words, it describes the degree of discrepancy freedom of community initiatives to decide autonomously about the design a project its contents' (Oteman et al, 2014).

Now, the question is which kind of institutional arrangements Germany has made over the last few decades to achieve the famous energy transition. Has it always been community-oriented or a mixture with the market-oriented system? In the next post, I will further look into the theoretical understanding of energy transition in Germany with a particular focus on this institutitonal arrangements theory. Any thoughts or questions are more than welcome as always. :)

What's All About Germany's Energiewende?

Photo.1. showing wind farms outside the Feldheim village during a visitors tour.

If you're engaged in or once dedicated to research in the field of energy policies, I guess you would almost certainly have heard of Germany's revolutionary movement called 'Energiewende'. The term represents the transition from a fossil fuel & nuclear-based sector towards a pro-renewable energy (RE) system (Oteman et al, 2014). As I quickly introduced in the last blog post, Germany now produces electricity from RE approximately by 27% this year, with half of them being privately owned by individuals or community cooperatives (National Geographic, 2015). Despite the country is ranked at the top in GHG emissions per capita in Europe, they are also the fastest in reducing their emissions, with an astonishing 27% decline since the 1990 level by 2012 (Figure.1). By 2020, they aim to further cut up to 40%, and by 2050, it is striving to achieve a 80% cut (Oteman et al, 2014). Note that, however, the graph below does not represent how much renewable energy has been introduced in the countries. France, for example, is far smaller in total emissions because of its reliance on nuclear power without much RE being installed.

Figure.1. A graph shows a shift in total emissions in some European countries from 1990 to 2012. Germany is one of the fastest, followed by the UK. (Source: National Geographic, 2015)

So, what distinguishes Germany from other European countries? Why have they been so successful in reducing GHGs emissions over the last few decades? These are some prominent questions I would like to address in the next few posts. 

To begin with, it would be helpful to explore some historical backgrounds of energiewende. The origin of the term traces back to 1980 when the German Oeko Institute published a study called 'Energiewende', which signifies the possibility of economic growth with less energy, therefore nuclear and petroleum can be demolished and replaced by renewable sources (Oeko Institute, 2015). Prior to this publication was a historical movement against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Wyhl, the south-west Germany (Energy Transition, 2015). Near the location is Freiberg where residents were first politically pressured by the authority saying blackouts would be highly likely in the case the plant wouldn't start operating. 

Despite the intimidation, local communities solidified to occupy the construction site and continuously demonstrated against their plan. In the end, the plan was abandoned - the first time ever the introduction of nuclear reactors was prevented in Germany (National Geographic, 2015). Now, Freiberg is known for its one of the highest per capita installed capacity in solar PV panels, with some 50 solar settlements which produce more energy than they consume (Rolf Disch, 2015). They are designed by a local architect Rolf Disch, who actively joined the Wyhl protests (Photo.2 & 3)

 
Photo.2. Poster / handout for Wyhl protests  (Reference: contrAtom, 2011)

       Photo.3. Wyhl protesters with a banner & placards  (Reference: MITWELT, 2015)

In fact, a series of anti-nuclear movement in 70-80s was not simply because of their concerns over safety. It was also about geopolitical tension to which Germany was once forced to be exposed in forefront geographically, namely the US and the Soviet superpowers. The US used to (and still today) hold their nuclear bombs in West Germany against the former, and that was what agitated against nuclear demolition nationwide. It is still an ongoing debate in the country as the recent decision to increase the US's atomic weapons in Germany in spite of the 2009 parliamentary decision to gradually withdraw them - completely against the will of the citizens (Washington's Blog, 2015).

The following was the emergence of the Germany's Green Party advocating for pacifism and opposition to nuclear power plant (National Geographic, 2015). In 1983, first Green representatives won the election for the Bundestag, Germany's national parliament. It was one of the socio-political milestone in Germany that has constituted what the country looks like today. After the 1986's Chernobyl disaster, their influence has become inevitable.

In 1990 when Germany became reunified after the Soviet collapse, a first feed-in tariff (FIT) bill was passed through the Bundestag (Energy Transition, 2015). However, it was not until 2000 when the system started to fully exert a potential force. Hans-Josef Fell (Photo.4), who has been one of the most influential Green Party politician was a key person. He used to be a member of the City Council in Hammelburg before he joined the Party, and helped the council pass an ordinance that ensures the municipal utility to guarantee the payment to any renewable energy producers to more than cover the installation costs therefore make a profit (Energy Transition, 2015). 'The payment had to be so high that investors could make a profit. We live in a market economy, after all', he said (National Geographic, 2015). This market-oriented theory is marked by a number of studies (Nolden, 2013; Oteman et al, 2014) although the degree is highly dependent upon the nature of agency, institution and biophysical characteristics of countries (Oteman et al, 2014).

The success story of Hammelburg then led Fell to ride a Green wave and into the Bundestag where the Green formed a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD). In 2000, he and Hermann Scheer (Photo.5), who is a prominent supporter for solar energy within the SPP, crafted a law called 'Renewable Energy Act' (Energy Transition, 2015). There are mainly two principles of the Act, first to mandate the FIT payment rates to be based upon the cost of investment instead of the retail rate (therefore above the market price), and second, to prioritize the renewable energy to be fed into a general grid with the guaranteed rate for 20 years.

  

Photo.4. Hans-Josef Fell (Green Party)

 

    Photo.5. Hermann Scheer (SPD) 'Faces of Energiewende'

This has made a number of individuals, communities confident enough to embark on their own renewable energy projects because they can plan well how long it would take to cover the cost and start making a profit. It also encourages active community investments on such projects because of the high creditability that the government provides under the formal legislation. It has been further accelerated by a traditional system of the state-owned bank KfW with €100 billion credit loans available between 2012 - 2017. These are some of the examples of structure-oriented force that explains the emergence of community initiatives (Oteman et al, 2014). As a result, there have been significant rises in many renewable energy production since 2000. For example, wind power generation almost doubled from 2000 and 2004 and still keeps growing until today (Figure.2).

Figure.2. A graph showing the shift in renewable energy production in Germany since 1990 in terawatt-hours.

Nevertheless, the country is not free of challenges. Firstly, since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, public opinion has been against nuclear power, which forced the government to call for a demolition plan of all their 17 plants by 2020 (Nolden, 2013). This raises a question about how the country would replace the supposedly 'green' energy, climate change-wise. Will they be successful in covering the nuclear generation by all the natural, clean force of energy? Or will they increase their import of nuclear / fossil fuel-based energy from nearby countries? There're also concerns about the over-exploitation of lignite (Photo.6), which is naturally rich in Germany, generating 26% of the total energy in the country (National Geographic, 2015). With hard coal mostly imported from outside (18%), the country still relies its energy source on coals by more than 40%. This also causes a massive destruction of Germany's beautiful forests through acid rain or mining activity itself.

Among these is traditional 'Big Four' (E.on, EnBW, RWE, Vattenfall), which have long been politically influential in delaying the energy transformation through lobbying (National Geographic, 2015). Today, they seem to rapidly increase the investment on renewable energy particularly offshore wind, yet, this could in turn price out small-scale community RE associations, which some critics say the another form of lobbying the government to favour big utilities in expanding RE. So, what would that mean to Germany's energy sector if community projects will not manage to increase in number and scale? 

From climate change perspectives, Germany also faces some other challenges regarding two major sources of GHGs emissions - transport (17% of GHGs) and heating system (30%) (National Geographic, 2015). The latter is to some extent locally provided by bio-gas through manure fermenter and direct heating from the sun (Oteman et al, 2014). However, the scale is very limited spatially and it cannot be expanded like a central energy system where electricity / gases are managed and provided by big utility companies. In addition, because of the biophysical characteristics of renewable energy, it's better to produce it where consumed. This is particularly critical when it comes to transmitting energy produced in the windy North to the more industrialized South where far more energy is demanded. The government and utility companies once proposed to build a high-voltage direct current (HVDC) such as the one connecting Bremen and Bavarian (Figure.3). 

Photo.6. showing a mining site for lignite at Vattenfall

Figure.3. A map showing the HVDC networks that connect the North Germany and Bavaria (Source: National Geographic, 2015).

Nonetheless, controversies still remain high because some landowners have rejected it as unnatural disturbance spoiling the natural beauty in their land. Also, the transmission loss of energy (mainly through heat) could be another potential limitation that questions the effectiveness of such transfer projects. Therefore, I think that they need to further expand the existing local-based, decentralized energy system not only to achieve the Germany's ambitious GHGs emissions cut but also to ensure local energy security that helps improve the national energy security as a whole. 

Here, I'm wondering how community energy production and big utility companies can cooperate, or compete well? Of course, what is the best way to provide energy to people is probably different from place to place, depending on the nature of agency, institution, and biophysical conditions as mentioned earlier. In the upcoming posts, I will try to address the questions raised above including the primary ones I mentioned at the beginning (perhaps one by one since there're too many). If you have any thoughts or questions, please feel free to share in comment. :) 

Community Power - Participation vs Ownership

Over the last few posts, I introduced some basic concepts of community power with a couple of contemporary examples particularly in energy sector. Today, I would like to cast a light upon the argument that 'community ownership of the shared equity/facility is not necessarily a prerequisite in sustainable management of the projects whereas participation is' (Nolden, 2013; Harvey and Reed, 2007).

First and foremost, it is important to provide a clear definition of the two terms I have just mentioned. 'Ownership' in this context refers to legitimate rights to own the capital on which communities invest, such as wind turbines and solar PV. 'Participation', on the other hand, is a form of commitment/engagement through which communities influence how the capital is developed and is managed in long-term. For example, farmers may want to lease their land to utility companies to develop a wind farm, or a community may also want to financially invest in the construction of solar PV panels and receive shares (Nolden, 2013). 

Figure.1. A photo of wind turbines in Grange Farm Wind Farm (Reference: Bulkington Wiltshire, 2015)

Indeed, Harvey and Reed, 2007 suggest in their study that fostering 'a sense of responsibility' for financially supporting the facility may be a more viable measure to achieve sustainability than achieving community ownership itself. Basically, if a community owns the capital it has a full responsibility for all aspects of management including application forms to local authority, financial planning and maintenance. In particular, the planning requirements for small scale feed-in-tariff in the UK are full of meticulous work because of their local regulation which primarily intends to avoid from any big company exploiting the local community (Nolden, 2013). 

In addition, communities must apply to the Microgeneration Certification Scheme (MOS) for the total installed capacity below 50kW or Ofgem for ROO-FIT accredition above in order to become an eligible installer/producer of any renewable energy (Ofgem, 2015). Given the lack of technical knowledge and experience of community members in energy sector, the above logistics cost and time to spend can easily discourage them from initiating community-owned renewable energy development. Therefore, ownership of community-led projects does not always turn out to be a successful manner.

'Participation', by contrast, is regarded as an indispensable element of community projects. It takes a variety of forms such as an intra-community outreach programme to promote renewable energy through educational activities and public open discussion, community investment including a land lease and the purchase of shares in energy companies developing on-site renewable energy production (Nolden, 2013). This is a type of social and institutional arrangement that helps a community feel responsible for their shared equity with much less financial and management risks being involved compared to when they actually own the capital.

Figure.2. A photograph showing a community projects for renewable energy at Ostrod Primary School in Norway(Reference: The Guardian, 2015)

Nevertheless, it does not to say that ownership is always a failure. There are a number of successful stories in community-owned projects across the world. Germany, for example, is a well-known country for its prevailing renewable energy through community initiatives. Currently, Germany's share of electricity by renewable energy is about 20% (53GW), 51% out of which is owned by citizens (BNU, 2012b in Nolden, 2013). The number is significant considering economies of scale that both benefits and encourages large utility companies to install a generator in greater capacity.

So, what makes community-owned projects become prosperous like in Germany? That's a question I would seek to address in the upcoming posts. Any ideas or questions are welcome as always. :)  

Roles of Internet in Fostering a Sense of Community

It's been about a month since I started writing a post for this blog. Today, I would like to share some of my thoughts that have recently come to my mind, that community power probably started to develop since the onset of rapid 'internet' prevalence. If, for example, there is no internet, how would you know that such a small, local-specific action exemplified in my last post is taking place somewhere? This becomes even harder when it goes beyond political or linguistic boundaries, within which the media coverage would be restricted simply because they have limited time and resources to cover everything. They have to choose on the basis of their interest which is undoubtedly influenced and sometimes even manipulated by the most powerful in society.


Figure.1 Map showing the 24-hour relative average use of internet in 2012. The levels are in order from the high to low; red, yellow, green, light blue and dark blue (Reference: SPIEGEL ONLINE, 2013)

With the widespread availability of internet (Figure.1), however, people are now free to voice their opinions, raise issues, and actively connect with those in remote whose existence would have not been recognised otherwise. It created the virtual space which is dimensionally 'non-space' but has given rise to instant, single-click communication regardless. Some people even insist that 'internet is another country', reflecting upon the fact that it has a certain degree of political power (UREG, 2015).

What such development enables the community is to share their experience of struggle outside their geographical, political arena along with drawing an international attention and support to their action. There are a sense of sorrow, sympathy, rage, generosity, and all sorts of economic and political motives that guide individual's decision. I guess what I am trying to say is that internet provides the community with a valuable opportunity to be internationally 'recognised and cared', and therefore boost its self-esteem to exercise more locally-derived democratic decision-making instead of top-down approach from the central government.

Now, let me briefly introduce an example of community-led climate action. The Big Lemon is a Community Interest Company (CIC) and runs the public bus services in Brighten, the South England. All their buses are fuelled with biodiesel from waste cooking oil from local restaurants. Their aim is to encourage local people to divert from using a private car, which exhausts 8 times more greenhouse gases than public transport (Emergent Research & Consulting, 2012). You can have a quick watch on the video below featuring their services.

Video.1. Promotion Video of the Big Lemon (Reference: The Big Lemon CIC, 2015)

Obviously, the relative contribution of their reduction in GHGs emissions in the city, and in global scale is very limited. However, what I think significant about them is that their small-scale local action plays an essential role in helping locals become more aware of the existence of 'community', and feel positive about their personal decision to use the services. With the help of knowledge and information derived from internet, people know what contributions they have made by their own actions and feel proud of themselves to be participating to climate change mitigation regardless of the scale. Here, the emphasis is not on the quantitative contribution of their CO2 reduction but on its effect on the attitude and perspective of the general public. Thereby, internet inevitably helps foster a sense of community among the people.

It's just a chain of thought without much supporting materials, so, it will be very appreciating if any of you share some thoughts or relevant studies with me. I very much look forward to your response to this post. :)

Too Small to be Effective? - Community Power in Mitigating Global Climate Change

Last week, I briefly introduced some of the key factors that have frequently affected how individuals perceive global climate change. Their personal experience of struggles related to climate change is geographically diverse in nature, and is highly dependent upon their socio-economic status. The implication of the heterogeneity in the effect of climate change is that there is not a single transferable practice of adaptation to solve them all across the globe simultaneously. Instead, there needs to be a community-based approach (CBA) which reflects and makes use of various regional characteristics (Reid, 2015).

The above short line of argument based on the previous post highlights the importance of regionally-derived adaptation to climate change. However, 'adaptation' itself does not seem, in the first instance, to make a direct contribution to mitigating global climate change in any way. Clearly, we need to decrease the atmospheric concentration of CO2 to tackle its root cause, potentially through applying some of the methods in the following approach that geoengineers have recently proposed - Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR). Although I will not explore this in detail here as it is beyond the scope of the purpose of this blog, I will highly recommend any of you interested in this topic to read the following introductory paper by Caldeira et al (2013). One of my peers also writes her blog on geoengineering here if you are keen to discuss. 

Coming back to the point, whereas 'adaptation' such as flood-control and changing crop patterns is critical to prevent a detrimental effect on people particularly the vulnerable, a 'mitigation' approach to climate change, exemplified in CO2 reduction, cannot be ignored to ultimately achieve a less violent climate and therefore more sustainable future of the Earth. They are not mutually exclusive but fundamentally interplay with each other. Indeed, the recent IPCC reports have put an increasing emphasis on adopting a balanced combination of the two in order to achieve security for sustainable food production, economic activity and ecosystem functioning (IPCC, 2014). 

Now, the question is - can community-led actions help mitigate the effects of climate change? 

Well, if you assume a single community power to be a catalyst for directly affecting the global climate, the answer is clearly 'NO' because any single community action on its own is comparatively way smaller than it can have a discernible impact on the planetary-scale climatic system. However, it is not what is being asked here. In essence, it is more to do with whether such a bottom-up approach is 'necessary' to ultimately achieve our sustainable vision of the Earth. 

In order to address the question, let's explore the following example. Low Carbon West Oxford (LCWO) is a community initiative charity group, which was set up following the three major flood events between 2001 and 2007. Since its launch in 2007, they have been working on a wide range of carbon reduction schemes such as introducing sustainable transport system, encouraging local food production and development in renewable energy. With the emergence of an Industrial and Provident society 'West Oxford Community Renewables (WOCR)' in 2009, the two are co-operating with each other towards the reduction in the community's CO2 emission by 80% by 2050. Some of their success stories in 2009/10 include a cut of 140 tonnes of CO2 emission in 36 participating households through the Low Carbon Living Programme within one year, and 80 tonnes of CO2 through the introduction of 2 street cars shared by 170 people.

The key ingredients for their continuous success are the following; a) direct exposure to flood events that brought about serious concerns over the effects of climate change in their future generation; b) great leadership of the County and City Council; c) availability of grants and prizes helping boost community investment; d) model of re-investing locally created income through their programmes within the community such as into their further charitable work (Figure.1). 

Figure.1. a diagram showing a flow-model of money and its contribution to sustainable living in the community of West Oxford. (Reference: Low Carbon West Oxford, 2015)

Barbara Hammond, a found of the LCWO, strongly supports the flowing model insisting that 'the economic benefit to developing these renewable energy projects is kept in the community, and can be used to create further economic development benefits about helping people to reduce their energy and therefore their energy bills', and thus, 'have a less pressured lifestyle economically' (Hammond, 2013). The first 5 minutes of the video below shows her summarizing their community work.   

Again, the relative contribution of their community programmes to reduction in the global atmospheric CO2 concentration is very limited. Nonetheless, they illustrate the following two fundamental characteristics of community-led projects. 

First, people are willing to take an action for their shared community concerns, not directly for climate change. Hammond clarified the point saying 'we all know you can't say that climate change caused that summer floods... but maybe this (experience of flood events) is the outcome of climate change. If I want my children to experience a different future, I need to do something about that'. In the research undertaken by Emergent Research & Consulting, (2012), such motive is defined as one of the two big factors that engage people in community action, so-called 'our future', meaning that sharing a story of a resilient and thriving place encourages their action. 

Secondly, their community project essentially includes direct benefits to individual's personal life, for example, reduction in energy bills and transport costs. This is another motivation that the study pronounces known as 'here and now', calling for the immediate benefits of action to their personal life. 

These two fundamental factors for success in community-led project are often overlooked in top-down approach of the central government, whose aims are, again, to achieve 'internationally negotiated CO2 reduction' in their country. They do not give much consideration to how climate change issues can be linked with and embedded into local concerns and struggles. That I think is where conflicts emerge between the central government and local communities because their local needs are frequently ignored under the national policy. Also, locally-funded nature of community projects is economically more sustainable than those under full financial support from the government because their central policy can easily be reversed or abandoned depending on their political situation. 

Given that communities are the only geographical space where significant CO2 reduction can take place, it is anticipated that such friction would heavily undermine the ability of national government to practice their climate change mitigation policy in their land. Therefore, I think that a bottom-up approach to climate change is critical and should not be under-valued just because of their relatively small impact on the global atmospheric CO2 concentration. They are the best identifying some of the inter-links between climate change and local concerns and needs, which is fundamental to achieving a successful, long-term community action. Although the scale-up of community-led climate change actions across a wider geographical area will be necessary to reduce the atmospheric concentration of CO2 at global scale, the first priority in human-based climate change mitigation programs in any country should be given to empowering community to act 'for themselves and by themselves'. 

I think this post highlights some of the essential roles that community power plays in tackling global climate change. Please do not hesitate to share your thoughts into this topic with me. :) P.S. Have a good reading week Geog folks!

Conceptualizing Global Climate Change As 'Our Struggle'

Everyone now knows that global climate change is something that is definitely happening today. The warming is 'unequivocal' with 95% certainty of human's predominant contribution to the cause - about 90% increase in probability from the preceding IPCC report (Carbon Trust, 2013). The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases including CO2, methane and nitrous oxide is clearly out of a predicted long-term trend of the Earth's atmospheric composition in the last 800,000 years at least (IPCC, 2014). Figure.1 below demonstrates a historical record of CO2, methane and temperature, derived from Antarctica's ice core Dome C. The rapid increase in both CO2 and methane since the 18th century is completely out of its long-term inter-glacial variation, which is generally accepted as being obliquity and precession driven (Jouzel, et al., 2007). Now, it is expected that the atmospheric temperature would go up to 3.7 - 4.8 degrees Celcius if the current emission levels remain the same by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 2014).


Figure.1. A left graph shows historical levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide (ppm), methane (ppb) and temperature (℃) over the last 800,000 years; A right graph consists of CO2 (ppm) and methane (ppb) over the last two millenniums. (Reference: Macmillan Publishers Ltd (2008) "Windows on the greenhouse" by Ed Brook, Nature 453: 291-292, in Environmental Defence Fund)


Similarly, there have also been anomalous rises in ocean surface temperature across the globe. This is attributed to the fact that ocean can absorb most of energy that enters into the Earth's climate system. In fact, 90% of all the energy has been stored into the ocean since 1971 (Light, 2014). Warmer ocean expands to raise sea levels that can cause economic and environmental destruction to coastal regions and islands, and trigger extreme weather through a greater amount of evaporation. However, what lacks in the analysis, I think, is that it is unable to draw a full picture of the potential effect of so-called 'still-inactive stored energy' in the ocean to the climate system in the future. What I specifically mean is that we cannot be sure whether the relationship between ocean temperature and the climate are in linear or logarithmic relationship, and therefore, whether the current rate of increasing and intensifying extreme weather would change in scale as more energy gets trapped in the ocean over time.

It is very simple - science cannot prove their prediction is 100% right nor wrong because of a number of limitations associated with their assumptions and methods. It is like sailing in the middle of the ocean where you only have a compass to guide yourself without a map. You know which direction you are heading to but never know if it is a right way to the destination you are aiming to reach. All you can do is to deduct from any signs like small islands, flow of the ocean, movement of fishes or birds to re-direct yourself to where you now think is an appropriate / better direction. Likewise, science is all about a sequence of observation and experiments that can or cannot provide you with a better prediction or solution. In the end, you have to make your own decision in whether to accept or decline the outcome.

Such uncertain and sometimes ambiguous elements of science have lost people's trust to some extent. Well, this is perhaps also blamed on to our tendency to over-trust scientists in providing a clear, definite answer to our question. However, in the context of global climate change, it might not be the case. What has been more problematic in our understanding about climate change over the last few decades, I suppose, is that many of us have failed to conceptualize it into something that is happening to our individual life, as 'our struggle'.

This is essentially due to the fact that spatial and temporal variation in the effect of climate change is very significant. Although temperature rises are expected in most parts of the world, the implication of the change in human's life is heterogeneous across the world (Thornton, et al., 2007). Their study suggests that whereas crop yields in Africa are expected to fall by 10-20% on average in response to future climate change, some regions are subject to increase. It is primarily because of topological variation in Africa, which plays an essential role in creating distinct rainfall patterns across the continent. For example, yields for maize generally increase at high altitudes while those at lower land see a drop due to increasing water stress when temperature rises. It is known as a temperature-driven increase in crop yields, with all other factors being equal (Thornton, et al., 2007).

Similarly, extreme weather is more intense in tropical regions because they absorb most of energy from the Sun and therefore temperature rises are the most significant. According to some numerical models, it is demonstrated that whereas global atmospheric temperature will go up to 4℃ by 2080 at the current rates of GHGs increases, it can rise up to 7℃ in southern Africa and 8℃ in East Africa (Independent, 2006). The estimation is very high and nearly double the global average level. Given that their lower socio-economic status, they cannot be well adapted to anomalous climatic events. Thus, climate change will certainly 'add more burdens to those who are already poor and vulnerable' (IPCC, 2007).

On the other hand, economically more developed countries, like USA, UK, Canada, France and Germany have tended to be and will likely to be less affected by climate change compared to the above regions. The fact is that these nations have been economically strong enough to ensure water, food and energy security more easily to meet their basic needs for life and economic activities, regardless of their actual physical potential. They are also better equipped with technology such as irrigation schemes and flood controls, which can help mitigate the effect of rising temperature or extreme weather induced by climate change  - truly technocentric viewpoint.

Therefore, despite some big steps have been made towards the global climate change negotiation recently, it is clear that their historical attitude of arrogance used to prevent their citizens from realizing climate change as their potential struggle. In other words, it is only a recent phenomenon that people started concerning over global climate change as something close to their personal life - concerns over geographically widespread outbreak of diseases due to warming; more frequent occurrence of torrential rain, typhoon or hurricane causing destruction of houses and loss of life; increased possibility to suffer skin cancer; crop failures, etc. Whatever personal experiences above and more, what is happening nowadays is that people are increasingly re-conceptualizing climate change as from something irrelevant into something that really affects their life. This, I think, is where community power is recognised and begins to develop.

With this in mind, I think that now it is time to talk about examples of community power. In the next post, I will review some historical examples of collective actions that took place in response to the growing awareness of global climate change. The biggest question I'm going to address in the upcoming weeks is whether community power is truly 'powerful' in a sense that can make a contribution to mitigating global climate change. Perhaps, too many ambiguous, buzzy words in political science. If you have any thoughts about power of community, personally or generally, please feel free to make a comment here. :) See you all soon!

Power of Collective Action

Over the past few decades, civil movements for global climate change are rapidly growing in number and scale. Perhaps, it follows the unprecedented rate of development in information technology that allows people to share their personal experiences relevant to climate change. Extreme weather, sea level rises, and increasing atmospheric temperature are some of the classic examples in the contemporary history of climate change.

As a result, people nowadays voice their opinions about climate change more easily and frequently on internet. This essentially has led to a rapid development of collective power, which goes beyond geographical boundaries that used to be a barrier to international/global actions for their common struggle.

Similarly, there has been a major shift in how people react to climate change at regional level. For instance, an increasing number of people now feel a sense of responsibility for potential consequences of their socio-economic activity that is being conducted in their home land. Among them is the emergence of community power where people assemble to take action for mitigating the effect of climate change. Hertford Energy Now is a good example of these. It is a non-profit organization that has promoted the development of community-owned energy generation in East Herts, England. They successfully installed solar PV panels in Mill Mead School, and they are currently on track to expand so-called 'HertsSolarSchools' across the region within the Phase 2 Project. This kind of community actions from the bottom is vital to practice a central government's policy such as Feed-in Tariff programme.

On the other hand, community power / collective action can also be politically active in mobilizing public opinion. Aizu Natural Energy Foundation, based in Fukushima, Japan, for instance, was launched in May 2013 two years after the Great East Japan Earthquake by a member of local inhabitants such as the representative partner of Yamatogawa Sake Brewery. In his interview, he criticizes Japanese government for leading the region to be economically dependent on surrounding cities:

"Before the earthquake, Fukushima had the food resources ten times more than the necessary amount in the prefecture, at about 1000%. And we had several GW electric facilities except nuclear power plants. There is an enormous potential of renewables available in Fukushima. However, almost all the energy produced in the region was distributed to the city areas, and then we bought it back by our selves. Fukushima was in a situation as if it is a colony of big city areas. Then, after the nuclear disaster, the strong will to overcome the situation grew inside myself, and I decided to pursue Fukushima's autonomous development" (Energy Democracy).

Their vision is to establish the local autonomy of energy and their micro-economy by introducing renewable energy into their region, mainly solar PV panels. Currently, the capacity of energy production running under this initiative exceeds 2.54MW. What is significant about this programme is that they are run by local people as well as being financially supported mainly by local banks and institutions (Energy Democracy). In other word, the regions is now moving forward to the rearrangement of local economy in structure by managing their demand-supply relationship by themeselves. Although their primary vision is not to mitigate climate change in regional level, their community action has certainly visualized recent political crisis in monopolized energy production in Japan. In this sense, community power can also play as a political power in civil society in whatever context.

Despite these successful stories, however, some argue that community power itself is no guarantee of success (Carter, et al., 1993). Particularly in less economically developed countries, there are a number of constrains associated with community action. For instance, many attempts have been made on installing water supply and sanitation programme in sub-Saharan Africa over the past few decades. However, they often ended up breaking down and being abandoned a few years after construction began. Carter, et al. reports on their paper that this is mainly because of the following three factors: local's unclear understanding of the existing problems with water supply and sanitation; their lack of awareness over beneficial impacts of the programme; and little understanding of factors that sustain their programme. The first two are summarized as lack of knowledge and awareness, and the third factor points out the fact that once a new system is introduced, investors often leave it to locals without developing maintenance programme ahead. Thus, governmental intervention in education and training as well as financial assistance are essential to some extent in order to sustainably manage a long-term local development still in many parts of the world.

To summarize above, although community power plays some key roles in mobilizing society, it is not always practically successful, depending on the socio-economic and political status of the region.

From next posts, therefore, I will explore many more cases of community power to discuss on this complex system, particularly by looking into roles it plays in shifting attitude and perspective of people towards global climate change. See you all next week!



Reference not to be hyper-linked:

Carter, R, Tyrrel S & Howsam P (1999) 'Impact and sustainability of community water supply and sanitation programmmes in developing countries', Journal of the Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, 13: 292-296.